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ENGLISH AUCTIONS AND THE STOLPER-SAMUELSON
THEOREM
JUAN DUBRA, FEDERICO ECHENIQUE, AND ALEJANDRO M. MANELLI
Abstract. We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not
be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient
ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has
not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one
for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these
seemingly unrelated results.
1. Introduction
A similar mathematical structure, comparative statics of the solution of a sys-
tem of equations, underlies diverse economic results such as the efficiency of the
English Auction and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We find that related as-
sumptions on the system of equations allow us to extend, significantly, the domain
of application of both results. We prove that the English auction has an efficient
ex post equilibrium in environments where this result had not been previously
obtained. We also prove versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem for economies
with more than two goods and factors, and for non-square economies.
Consider the system of equations
(1)
v1(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = p1
v2(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = p2
...
...
...
vn(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = pn
Date: December 26, 2007.
JEL Classification. C60, D44, F11.
The results in this paper were circulated earlier as “Minimal Assumptions for Efficiency in
Asymmetric English Auctions,” by Dubra, and “Comparative Statics, English Auctions and
the Stolper Samuelson Theorem,” by Echenique and Manelli. We thank Rabah Amir, Sergei
Izmalkov, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Peter Neary, John Quah, Kevin Reffett, and Chris
Shannon for useful comments. Manelli’s research was partially supported by NSF grants SES-
0095524 and SES-0241373.
1
2 DUBRA, ECHENIQUE, AND MANELLI
where s1, s2, . . . , sn are the unknowns, p1, p2, . . . , pn are the parameters, and
v1, . . . , vn are functions. How does the solution (s1, . . . , sn) respond to changes
in the parameters (p1, . . . , pn)? To provide a meaningful answer to this classic
question, restrictions must be imposed on the functions v1, . . . , vn.
Our assumptions have the flavor of a “relative sensitivity” requirement. Sup-
pose each function vi is relatively more sensitive to one variable (which we will call
“its own” variable) than to the others. If the effect of such variable si on vi is an
“own” effect, we might require that the own effect be relatively more important
than the “cross” effect, the effect of si on vj. Suppose for instance that n = 2
and that v1(s1, s2) and v2(s1, s2) are increasing functions. Let parameters change
so that p′1 > p1 and p
′
2 < p2. Since v1 and v2 are increasing, s1 and s2 cannot
both increase or decrease simultaneously. Our “relative sensitivity” implies, as
a consequence, that s′1 > s1 and s
′
2 < s2. We warn the reader that our formal
assumption varies with the application considered, and that it differs from the
discursive version in this paragraph. Still, the intuitive rendition illustrates its
use.
We now describe how a similar formal structure underlies both applications,
the efficiency of the English auction and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. For
expositional ease, we begin with the latter.
Consider an economy with two goods, two factors of production, and constant-
returns-to-scale technologies. Let vi(s1, s2), i = 1, 2, be the per unit cost of
producing good i given factor prices (s1, s2). If output prices (p1, p2) are ex-
ogenously determined—the standard small-country assumption in international
trade—an equilibrium in the factors’ markets is the solution to
(2)
v1(s1, s2) = p1
v2(s1, s2) = p2.
The interpretation of (2) is that there are no extraordinary profits in the produc-
tion of goods 1 and 2—a consequence of the combined assumptions, standard in
international trade theory, that both goods are produced in equilibrium and that
the technologies are constant returns to scale.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that if the production of good 1 is rel-
atively more intense in the use of factor 1, an exogenous increase in the price of
good 1 brings about an increase in the price of factor 1 and a decrease in the price
of factor 2. Let K and L represent factors 1 and 2 respectively, and let Ki(s1, s2)
and Li(s1, s2) be the cost-minimizing quantities of factors in sector i when factor
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prices are (s1, s2). Stolper and Samuelson’s factor intensity assumption is that
(3)
K1(s1, s2)
L1(s1, s2)
>
K2(s1, s2)
L2(s1, s2)
.
Using Shepard’s lemma, however, the factor intensity assumption can be stated
as
∂v1(s1, s2)/∂s1
∂v1(s1, s2)/∂s2
>
∂v2(s1, s2)/∂s1
∂v2(s1, s2)/∂s2
for all (s1, s2). It is this formulation in terms of average cost functions that
facilitates our approach. Stolper and Samuelson’s factor-intensity condition is an
instance of our “relative sensitivity” property. Expressed as an inequality of factor
ratios, the factor-intensity condition does not readily generalize to economies with
more than two goods and two factors. We will make our “relative sensitivity”
assumption on the average cost curves, and this allows us to extend the notion
of factor intensity to economies with more than two factors, and to non-square
economies. In turn, this leads to new versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
We turn to our auctions application. Consider an English auction where two
(ex ante) different bidders have interdependent valuations. Bidder i, i = 1, 2, only
observes her private signal si before the auction, and i’s valuation for the object
is vi(s1, s2). If p is the price quoted by the auctioneer, a solution (s1(p), s2(p)) to
the system
(4)
v1(s1, s2) = p
v2(s1, s2) = p
indicates that both bidders are indifferent between getting the object and aban-
doning the auction. If the solution (s1(p), s2(p)) to (4) is increasing in p, then
it has an inverse (p1(s1), p2(s2)). This inverse function can be used to construct
bidding strategies: bidder i with signal si will remain in the auction until the
auctioneer arrives at price pi(si). Under certain “relative sensitivity” assump-
tions on the value functions, it can be shown that that these bidding strategies
implement an efficient ex post equilibrium in the English auction.
The question of whether English auctions have efficient ex post equilibria in
the environments described, was first posed by Maskin (1992). He studied the
two-bidder case and assumed a “single crossing condition,” namely that
(5) ∀(s1, s2), ∂v1
∂s1
(s1, s2) ≥ ∂v2
∂s1
(s1, s2)
This condition captures the notion that si is more important for vi than sj,
j 6= i and it therefore belongs to the “relative sensitivity” family of assumptions.
Maskin proved that his condition implies that a solution (s1(p), s2(p)) to (4)
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exists, that it is unique and increasing, and that the implicit bidding strategies
implement an efficient ex post equilibrium.
Maskin’s result, however, does not extend to auctions with more than two
bidders. Krishna (2003) describes a three-bidder example, satisfying Maskin’s
single-crossing property (applied pairwise), where the English auction does not
have an efficient equilibrium.1 Our “relative sensitivity” allows us to prove the
existence of ex post efficient equilibria with arbitrarily many bidders.
The reader will have noticed that Stolper and Samuelson’s factor-intensity
condition and Maskin’s single crossing property are very similar.
2. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem
We prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The first one applies
to square economies with n goods and factors of production; the second applies
to non-square economies.
Consider a standard international-trade model. There are n non-traded, non-
produced factors used in the production of n traded, final goods. Factor en-
dowments are owned by consumers who offer them inelastically. Inputs are not
consumed. A small-country assumption implies that the prices p = (p1, . . . , pn)
of the n consumption goods are exogenously given. The endogenous vector of
factor prices is denoted by s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn). The production technology ex-
hibits constant returns to scale. The unit cost of producing good i given factor
prices (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn); the cost of producing yi units of good i
is then vi(s)yi. An equilibrium in this model is characterized by the zero-profit
conditions: A combination of prices (s1, s2, . . . , sn, p1, p2, . . . , pn) is an equilibrium
if pi = vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn) for all i.
2
Stolper and Samuelson (1941) further assume that there are only two goods
and two factors, that the per-unit cost functions vi are differentiable, and that the
production of good 1 is relatively more intense in the use of factor 1 as discussed
in the Introduction. The thesis of their theorem is that an exogenous increase in
the price of good 1 brings about an increase in the price of factor 1 and a decrease
in the price of factor 2.
1Krishna attributes the idea of the example to Phil Reny. Krishna (2003) also introduces
alternative conditions to Maskin’s single crossing property that restore the existence of efficient
equilibria for environments with the n bidders. We compare our results to Krishna’s below.
2Implicit is the assumption—standard in trade-theory—that all goods are produced in equilib-
rium, since pi could be less than vi(s1, s2, . . . , sn) if good i is not produced.
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Of their extra assumptions, we only need the “relative sensitivity” assumption,
a notion of factor intensity that can be applied to more general economies than
those studied by Stolper and Samuelson.
Let
P (s′ − s) = {i = 1, . . . , n : s′i − si > 0}.
The set P (s′−s) identifies the coordinates that have increased, the strictly positive
coordinates of (s′ − s).
Definition. The functions v1, v2, . . . , vn satisfy the dominant-effect property if,
for any s and s′ with P (s′ − s) 6= ∅,
max
i∈P (s′−s)
vi(s
′)− vi(s) > max
j /∈P (s′−s)
vj(s
′)− vj(s).
The dominant-effect property is a relative-factor-intensity assumption. In the
two-factor-two-good case, it states that if the price of factor 1 increases and the
price of factor 2 decreases, then the cost of good 1 must increase more than the
cost of good 2 (or the cost of good 2 must decrease more than the cost of good 1).
That is to say, the production of every good i must be relatively more intense in
the use of the factor i. Indeed, with differentiable cost functions and n = 2, the
Stolper-Samuelson factor-intensity assumption (3) implies the dominant-effect
property.
The dominant-effect property generalizes the notion of relative factor-intensity
to economies with more than two goods and with non-differentiable cost func-
tions. Suppose several factor prices change simultaneously. The dominant-effect
property requires that one of the goods whose “corresponding factor-price” has
increased must have a larger cost-increase than the cost-increase of any good
whose “corresponding factor-price” decreased.
Theorem 1. Let v1, v2, . . . , vn be non-decreasing average cost functions that sat-
isfy the dominant-effect property. Let the price-vectors (s,p) and (s′,p′) be equi-
libria. If p′i > pi for some good i, and p
′
h ≤ ph for all h 6= i , then s′i > si.
If, in addition, the functions v1, v2, . . . , vn are strictly increasing, then s
′
h < sh
for at least one h 6= i.3
Proof. Let pi = vi(s) and p
′
i = vi(s
′) for all i. Suppose for some j, p′j > pj and
p′i ≤ pi for all i 6= j.
Since (v1, v2, . . . , vn) are non-decreasing and p
′
j > pj, it cannot be the case that
s′ ≤ s. Therefore P (s′ − s) is non-empty.
3A function vi(s) is strictly increasing if s′ > s implies vi(s′) > vi(s); it is non-decreasing if
s′ ≥ s implies vi(s′) ≥ vi(s).
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We prove that j is in P (s′ − s). Suppose that j is not in P (s′ − s). Then,
by the dominant-effect property, for some i ∈ P (s′ − s), p′i − pi > p′j − pj. A
contradiction, since p′j − pj > 0 and p′i − pi ≤ 0 for all i 6= j. We conclude that j
is in P (s′ − s).
If the functions v1, v2, . . . , vn are strictly increasing, then s
′ > s implies p′h > ph
for all h. Since p′h ≤ ph for all h 6= i, it cannot be the case that s′ > s. Thus,
there is h such that s′h − sh < 0; h cannot be equal to i, as s′i − si > 0. 
In the two-factor-two-good case, Theorem 1 states that if a country opens up
to trade and as a consequence p1 increases while p2 either decreases or stays the
same, then the price of factor 1 will increase and the price of factor 2 will decrease.
Thus the owners of factor 1 will gain and the owners of factor 2 will lose from
opening up to trade.
In the n-factor-n-good case, Theorem 1 states that, if p1 increases, and ph either
decreases or stays the same, for all other goods h, then the owners of factor 1 will
gain, and the owners of at least one of the other factors will lose. Note that the
thesis of Theorem 1 is weaker in this case because it does not say that s′h < sh
for all h 6= i.4
Theorem 1 delivers the message of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in consid-
erable generality. It is global because, unlike the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem,
it applies to any changes in prices, not only infinitesimal changes. In summary,
the differences between Theorem 1 and Stolper and Samuelson’s statement are
as follows.
(1) Stolper and Samuelson’s relative factor-intensity condition for two goods
is stronger than the dominant-effect property.
(2) Stolper and Samuelson’s conclusion is local; the conclusion of Theorem 1
is global.
(3) Stolper and Samuelson require that the cost functions (v1, v2, . . . , vn) be
differentiable, and that the Implicit Function Theorem be applicable; The-
orem 1 does not.
(4) Stolper and Samuelson’s version of the theorem only holds when n = 2
(see, for example, Chipman (1969)).
The original Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, and its generalization in Theorem 1,
share the assumption that the number of final goods is the same as the number
of factors. This is probably unrealistic. We offer a generalization of the Stolper-
Samuelson Theorem that avoids this assumption. The generalization is obtained
by simply varying the dimensionality of the variables si and pj from scalars
4Chipman (1969) calls this statement the Weak Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
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to vectors. Then, the same framework used in Theorem 1 yields the desired
extension.
We can identify the technologies behind each vi with a sector, producing a
collection of mi final goods. Hence, vi(s) is a vector in R
mi , and so is the corre-
sponding parameter pi in system (1). The vector pi in R
mi is the vector of prices
for the mi final goods produced by sector i. The total number of final goods
produced is the sum of goods produced by all sectors, i.e., M =
∑n
i=1mi.
For each sector i there is a group of ki factors that are used more intensively
in Sector i. (We make this precise below in the formal definition.) In terms of
the model, the variable si belongs to R
ki ; si represents the vector of factor-prices
corresponding to the ki ‘factors used more intensively in sector i’. The total
number of factors in the economy is simply the sum of all groups of factors, i.e.
K =
∑n
i=1 ki.
Each sector i has a constant-returns technology that can be represented by an
average-cost function vi : R
K → Rmi .
We have thus redefined system (1) so that all variables are vectors. If we set
ki = 1 = mi for all i = 1, . . . , n, we are back in the framework of Theorem 1, an
n-sector economy with n final goods and n factors. If in addition n = 2, we have
the classic Stolper-Samuelson environment.
We now adapt the dominant effect property to the new environment, and to do
so, we must look at the set P (s′ − s) that figures conspicuously in its definition.
Given s′, s, and an order , let
P (s′ − s) = {i = 1, . . . , n : s′i − si  0}.
In our previous applications when si was a scalar, the order  was the standard
order on the real line; the meaning of s′i  si is simply s′i > si. In the new
environment si is a ki-dimensional vector and therefore we have options in defining
s′i  si. We choose the following order
s′i  si if and only if s′i  si
yielding
P (s′ − s) = {i = 1, . . . , n : s′i − si  0}.
We will briefly comment on alternative definitions of after we state the theorem.
We are now ready to state the adapted dominant-effect property. The functions
v1, v2, . . . , vn satisfy the adapted dominant-effect property if for any s
′ and s with
P (s′ − s) 6= ∅,
max
{`=1,...mi:i∈P (s′−s)}
v`i(s
′)− v`i(s) > max{`=1,...mj :j /∈P (s′−s)} v`j(s
′)− v`j(s),
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where v`j(s) is the `
th component of the mj-dimensional vector vj(s).
The adapted dominant-effect property is simply an expression of the factor-
intensity assumption, as discussed for square economies.
As before, we say that a pair of prices (s,p) is an equilibrium if pi = vi(s) for
i = 1, . . . , n.
Theorem 2. Let v1, v2, . . . , vn be non-decreasing and satisfy the adapted dominant-
effect property. Let (s,p) and (s′,p′) be equilibria. If p′i > pi for some good i,
and p′h ≤ ph for all h 6= i, then there is 1 ≤ ` ≤ ki such that s′`i > s`i, where s`i
is the price of factor ` within the group of factor prices si.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and therefore we omit it. Alternative
definitions of the order  used, give rise to variations of the dominant-effect
property and of the theorem above. For instance, if we strengthen the adapted
dominant-effect property so that s′i  si if and only if s′i  si, the theorem then
concludes that s′`i > s`i for all `, ` = 1, . . . , ki: the prices of all factors (in which
sector i is intensive) increase.
We conclude the section with a discussion of related literature. There is a large
literature on generalizations of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. We refer the in-
terested reader to Ethier (1984) for a survey. The closest result to Theorem 1 is
an application of the weak axiom of cost minimization (Ethier (1984)). This ap-
plication, however, barely retains the economic content of the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem because it does not say which factor-prices change as a result of specific
changes in goods prices.5 In trade theory, predicting who will win (and thus
favor) an opening to trade, is important. Contrary to Theorem 1, the application
of the weak axiom only gives the standard “average correlation” result between
goods and factor prices: on-average-higher good prices yield on-average-lower
factor prices. On the other hand, the application of the weak axiom does not
require assumptions on v, it is purely a product of cost minimization.
When n = 2, Samuelson (1953) also proved the Factor-Price Equalization
Theorem: if v satisfies the relative factor-intensity condition, v(s) has a global
inverse, so factor prices are uniquely determined by p. In the context of trade,
this implies that all countries that share the same technology must have the
same factor prices. This is, arguably, an empirically less relevant proposition
than the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, or than Theorem 1. When n > 2, the
5The comparison with Jones and Scheinkman’s (1977) “every factor has some natural enemy”
result is similar. Jones and Mitra’s (1995) version of Stolper Samuelson involves a dominant
diagonal condition, which shares the spirit of the dominant effect property. But they also
require additional strong assumptions: that the profile of factor shares take an identical (up to
a permutation) geometric decay form for all sectors.
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relative factor-intensity condition is not sufficient for the existence of a global
inverse. Gale and Nikaido (1965) proved that, if v is C1, and the Jacobian of
v is everywhere a P -matrix—all the principal minors of v are positive—then
v is globally invertible. But even if the Jacobian is everywhere a P -matrix,
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem need not hold (Chipman, 1969). Theorem 1
shows that our generalization of the factor-intensity condition suffices to give the
Stolper-Samuelson result with n > 2. We do not need to address the problem of
the existence of a global inverse.
3. English Auction
We study the irrevocable exit English Auction introduced by Milgrom and
Weber (1982). In this game the auctioneer continuously raises the asking price,
starting from zero. A bidder has the option of quitting the auction publicly at
any time. Once a bidder quits, the bidder cannot reenter. The last bidder to
remain active is the winner and pays the price called at the time that the previous
to the last bidder leaves the auction.
We prove that the English auction has an efficient ex post equilibrium in mod-
els where bidders may have interdependent valuations and need not be ex ante
identical.
3.1. A Sufficient Condition. Let N = {1, 2..., n} be the set of players. Each
player i observes a signal si ∈ [0, b]. This signal is only known to player i. Signals
are drawn according to some probability measure µ over [0, b]n that need not
posses a density. The signals affect the values that players have for the objects.
Player i’s valuation is a continuous function vi : [0, b]
n → R that maps profiles of
signals (one for each player) into real numbers, with vi (0) = 0 for all i, and that
is strictly increasing in its own signal, so that for all i and all s−i in [0, b]
n−1 ,
s′i > si implies vi (s
′
i, s−i) > vi (si, s−i). For any s, let
W (s) = {i ∈ N : vi (s) ≥ vk (s)∀k ∈ N}.
We refer toW (s) as the set of “winners” at s and denote by |W (s)| the cardinality
of W (s) .
We now define two properties that are jointly sufficient for the existence of an
efficient equilibrium.
Definition. The functions v1, . . . , vn are increasing at ties if for every s such that
|W (s)| > 1 and all i ∈ W (s)
s′ ≥ s
s′j > sj implies j ∈ W (s)
}
⇒ vi
(
s′i, s
′
−i
) ≥ vi (s′i, s−i) .
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The interpretation of the above property is as follows. Suppose s is a profile of
signals for which at least two players have equal and highest valuations. Then,
the property requires that if one of the winner’s signal increases to s′i, then the
effect of the other player’s signals, when they increase from s−i to s′−i, does
not hurt player i. Example 6 of Maskin (2001) shows that even if some sort of
single crossing property is satisfied, one still needs that player j’s signal does not
affect player i’s valuation “very” negatively, if an efficient equilibrium is to exist
(an equilibrium is efficient if it always allocates the object to one of the players
with the highest valuation). Valuations in Maskin’s example are not increasing
at ties, and that is why he finds that no efficient equilibrium exists. Stronger
versions of this property have been standard in the literature. The most common
assumption of this kind is that vi is increasing in si and weakly increasing in s−i.
The only paper in this literature that has an assumption that is not stronger
than increasing at ties is in Krishna (2003). The assumption in that paper is
neither weaker nor stronger than increasing at ties: it states that when i’s signal
increases, the sum of all player’s valuations increases.
Definition. The functions v1, . . . , vn satisfy the own effect property (OEP) if for
every s such that |W (s)| > 1,
s′ ≥ s
s′j > sj implies j ∈ W (s)
}
⇒ max
j:s′j>sj
vj (s
′) ≥ max
k:s′k=sk
vk (s
′)
It states that the effect of an increase in some signals is larger for one of the
players whose signal increased than for all the rest of the players. Notice that it
is a form of single crossing: if there are only two players, j’s valuation is equal
to k’s and j’s signal increases, j’s valuation is larger than k’s. As will be shown
later, it is the weakest form of “single crossing” that has been used in this branch
of the literature.
In the auction we study, a strategy for a player is a function that determines a
price at which to quit, for each realization of the private information, and each
history of who left the auction at what price. Formally, a strategy for bidder i
is a collection of functions, one for each set of (active) players A and each profile
pN\A of prices at which bidders in N\A quit the auction, βAi : [0, b] ×RN\A+ →
R+ where i ∈ A, |A| > 1 and βAi
(
si,p
N\A) > max {pj : j ∈ N\A} . The value
βAi
(
si,p
N\A) is the price at which bidder i will drop out if players inN\A dropped
at prices pN\A and nobody quits before. As long as p < βAi
(
si,p
N\A) he stays
in the auction; he drops out when p = βAi
(
si,p
N\A) ; in any history in which
p > βAi
(
si,p
N\A) he drops out (this part of the strategy will never be used). A
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profile of strategies is an ex-post equilibrium if it remains an equilibrium even if
all players know everybody else’s signals.
Theorem 3. If v1, . . . , vn are increasing at ties and satisfy the own effect prop-
erty, then the English auction has an efficient ex post equilibrium.
3.2. Necessity. Theorem 3 shows that the own-effect property is sufficient for
the existence of equilibrium. We now prove that, under a regularity condition on
valuations, there is a sense in which the own-effect property is also necessary for
the existence of efficient equilibria in undominated strategies.
So far we have said that an equilibrium is efficient if it allocates the object
to one of the players with the highest valuation for all profiles of signals. This
definition of efficiency is the most demanding if one is concerned with finding
sufficient conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. But one could
also use another definition of efficiency which is more demanding for necessity,
and less so for sufficiency. Let us say that if an equilibrium of the English auction
(with valuations v and distribution of signals µ) assigns the object to the highest
bidder with µ−probability 1 it is µ−efficient.
Suppose now that we want to prove a theorem like “If property P of the profile
of valuations v is violated, then there is no µ−efficient equilibrium for any µ.”
There is no hope for such a theorem, because if we assume vi (0) = 0 for all i and
set µ (0) = 1, then any strategy profile that has βNi (0, ∅) = 0 (all players quit
at p = 0, when all players are active, if they have a signal of 0) is a µ−efficient
equilibrium. Hence, we will show a theorem of the form “If property P of the
profile of valuations v is violated, then there is a µ such that no µ−efficient
equilibrium exists.”
Definition. The functions v1, . . . , vn are regular if each vi is twice continuously
differentiable and for all s with |W (s)| > 1 the Jacobian matrix of partial deriva-
tives of subsets of the winners is invertible, or more formally, for all P ⊆ W (s) ,
(6) DPv (s) =
(
∂vi (s)
∂sj
)
i,j∈P
is invertible.
We now show that in the presence of the regularity assumption above, the own
effect property is necessary.6 We also assume that if two or more players quit at
6One can obtain a simple proof of the result using Theorem 7 below, which shows that the single
crossing property in Birulin and Izmalkov (2003) is stronger than the own effect property, and
their necessity result. In that case, one has to assume that gradients are positive.
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the same price, the tie is broken assigning the object to each player with positive
probability. 7
Theorem 4 (Necessity of the own effect property). Let the functions v1, . . . , vn be
regular and increasing at ties. If v1, . . . , vn do not satisfy the own effect property
for some interior points s and s′ with s′ > s, then there is a µ such that no
µ-efficient equilibrium in undominated strategies exists.
3.3. Related Literature. In this section we show that the two properties used
by Krishna (Average and Cyclical Crossing Conditions) imply the own-effect
property. We also show that under the structure used by Birulin and Izmalkov
(2003), their “generalized single crossing property” is equivalent to the OEP.
For any P ⊆ N, let IP denote the vector in Rn with 1 in the jth coordinate iff
j ∈ P and 0 otherwise and let ∇vk denote the gradient of vk.
Definition. Say that v satisfies
(a) Krishna’s Average Crossing Condition (ACC) if for any s with |W (s)| > 1
and i 6= j
n∑
k=1
∂vk
∂sj
> n
∂vi
∂sj
.
(b) Krishna’s Cyclical Crossing Condition (CCC) if for all j
∂vj
∂sj
>
∂vj+1
∂sj
≥ ∂vj+2
∂sj
≥ ...∂vj−1
∂sj
holds at every s with |W (s)| > 1, where j + k ≡ (j + k) modulo n.
Theorem 5. If v satisfies the Average Crossing, or the Cyclical Crossing, con-
dition, then it satisfies the OEP.
As an illustration of the importance of the OEP assumption for auctions, we
now show that when there are two players, it is weaker than the Single Crossing
condition: Suppose there are two players; the functions v = (v1, v2) satisfy the
Single Crossing Condition if at any s such that v1 (s) = v2 (s)
∂vi (s)
∂sj
<
∂vj (s)
∂sj
.
This is the version in Dasgupta and Maskin (2000). In Maskin (1992) the
inequality is weak, but applies to all s. Since single crossing is necessary for the
existence of efficient equilibria in two-player auctions, the OEP is also necessary.
7Papers that deal with necessity have usually assumed this either explicitly or implicitly.
ENGLISH AUCTIONS AND STOLPER SAMUELSON 13
Corollary 6. With 2 players, OEP is weaker than Single Crossing. Suppose that
there are only two players, and that v1 and v2 are differentiable. If v satisfies the
SC condition or the (Maskin) Single Crossing, it satisfies the OEP.
Corollary 6 is a consequence of Theorem 5, as both of Krishna’s conditions
are equivalent to Single Crossing with two players. We present a direct proof of
Corollary 6 because it is simple and instructive.
Proof of Corollary 6. Take any s′′ with |W (s′′)| > 1 (i.e. v1 (s′′) = v2 (s′′)) and an
s′ ≥ s′′ such that s′1 > s′′1, s′2 = s′′2. We will now show that v1 (s′1, s′′2) ≥ v2 (s′1, s′′2) .
Let
ε∗ = max {ε ∈ [0, 1] : v1 (εs′ + (1− ε) s′′) ≥ v2 (εs′ + (1− ε) s′′)}
and notice that ε∗ is well defined, since 0 belongs to the set over which the
maximum is taken. If ε∗ = 1, there is nothing to prove, so suppose that the
OEP is violated, so that ε∗ < 1. Define s = ε∗s′ + (1− ε∗) s′′. We then have:
v1 (s) = v2 (s) and for all s1 such that s
′
1 > s1 > s1, v1 (s1, s2) < v2 (s1, s2)
obtains. This implies that for all s1 > s1
v1 (s1, s2)− v1 (s) < v2 (s1, s2)− v2 (s)⇒ ∂v1 (s)
∂s1
≤ ∂v2 (s)
∂s1
which contradicts the SC condition, and therefore proves that if SC holds, so does
the OEP.
We will now show that if the Maskin Single Crossing holds, so does the OEP.
As before, assume ε∗ < 1, so that
(7) v1 (s
′
1, s
′′
2) < v2 (s
′
1, s
′′
2)
and define s = ε∗s′ + (1− ε∗) s′′ which implies v1 (s) = v2 (s). This last equality
and equation (7) contradict Maskin’s Single Crossing since ∀s1 ∈ [s′1, s1]
∂v1 (s1, s
′′
2)
∂s1
≥ ∂v2 (s1, s
′′
2)
∂s1
⇒
s′1∫
s1
∂v1 (s1, s
′′
2)
∂s1
ds1 ≥
s′1∫
s1
∂v2 (s1, s
′′
2)
∂s1
ds1
⇒ v1 (s′1, s′′2)− v1 (s1, s′′2) ≥ v2 (s′1, s′′2)− v2 (s1, s′′2)⇔ v1 (s′1, s′′2) ≥ v2 (s′1, s′′2)
as was to be shown. 
We now turn to Birulin and Izmalkov (2003). We show that our Theorem 3
implies their main result. The main assumptions in Birulin and Izmalkov are:
regularity (introduced in equation (6)), that ∇vj (s) ≥ 0 for all j and s (which
implies increasing at ties), and the following property:
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Definition. The set of functions v satisfy the Generalized Single Crossing prop-
erty if for any s with |W (s)| > 1 and any A ⊆ W (s) ,
max
j∈A
u∇vj (s) ≥ u∇vk (s)
for all k ∈ W (s) \A and any u such that ui > 0 for i ∈ A and uj = 0 otherwise.
The next result shows that if one assumes all the conditions of Birulin and
Izmalkov, then the GSC and the OEP are equivalent.
Theorem 7. Suppose that s is drawn from a density, v’s are twice differentiable,
regular, and ∇vj (s) ≥ 0 for all j and s. Then, v satisfies the OEP if and only if
it satisfies the GSC.
Proof. If v satisfies the GSC, it satisfies the OEP. Pick any s such that
|W (s)| > 1 and suppose that s′ ≥ s and s′j > sj only for some j ∈ W (s) .We will
now show that maxj:s′j>sj vj (s
′) ≥ maxk:s′k=sk vk (s′). To obtain a contradiction,
suppose that for some player i with s′i = si we have vi (s
′) = maxk:s′k=sk vk (s
′) >
maxj:s′j>sj vj (s
′) . In the equilibrium proposed by Birulin and Izmalkov, all players
with s′i = si are inactive at p = vj (s) for j such that s
′
j > sj (either they had quit
before p or quit at p) and so cannot win the auction when types are s′. Since the
players with maximum valuations at s′ are inactive, the equilibrium cannot be
efficient, which would contradict Proposition 1 in Birulin and Izmalkov (which
asserts that, under their assumptions, the proposed equilibrium is efficient). This
proves that the OEP is weaker than GSC.
If v satisfies the OEP, it satisfies the GSC. Suppose that v does not satisfy
the GSC so that for some s with |W (s)| > 1 and some A ⊆ W (s) ,
max
j∈A
u∇vj (s) < u∇vk (s)
for some k ∈ W (s) \ A and some u such that ui > 0 for i ∈ A and uj =
0 otherwise. Then, it must be the case that for ε sufficiently small we have
vk (s+εu) > maxj∈A vj (s+εu) contradicting the OEP (with s′ = s+εu). 
The following example shows that GSC is not sufficient in the absence of reg-
ularity.
Example. Suppose two players, 1 and 2, whose signals s1 and s2 are drawn
independently from a density on [0, 1] . Let
z1 (s1) = (2s1 − 1)5 and z2 (s1) =
{
(2s1 − 1)3 s1 ≤ 12
2 (2s1 − 1)3 s1 ≥ 12
It is easy to check that if valuations are vi (s) = s1 + s2 + zi (s1) + 1, then all
of Birulin and Izmalkov’s assumptions are satisfied, except for regularity. Also,
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there is no efficient equilibrium, since we would need that for all s1 <
1
2
, β1 (s1) >
β2 (s2) for all s2 and for all s1 >
1
2
, β1 (s1) < β2 (s2) for all s2. But then, when
player 1 has a signal of 1, he is strictly better off bidding as if he had a signal of
1/4, showing that there is no efficient equilibrium.
4. Final Remarks
We have used similar “relative sensitivity” assumptions on a system of equa-
tions to obtain results in two seemingly different applications. Intuitively we
require that a variable be associated to each function so that the own effect
is stronger than the cross effect. There are alternative formalizations of this
intuition. We used three different ones in the paper, the dominant-effect, the
adapted dominant-effect, and the own effect property. The adapted dominant-
effect is simply a version of the dominant-effect adapted to non-scalar variables,
for the non-square Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
The own effect property is weaker than the dominant-effect property. In try-
ing to establish the efficiency of the English auction we looked for the weakest
condition that would yield the result. Indeed, we also show that the own-effect
property is necessary if one is willing to assume a regularity condition.
Both properties, however, have much in common. Suppose there are three
functions with three variables and that each variable si has a stronger influence
on vi than the other variables do. Both properties rule out the possibility that if
s1 and s2 increase, the change in v3 might dominate the changes in v1 and v2.
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Appendix A. Proof of results on English auctions.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the construction of an equilibrium with
certain properties. This kind of equilibrium was previously used in Milgrom and
Weber (1982), Maskin (1992), Krishna (2003) and Birulin and Izmalkov (2003).
It is based on the following simple idea. Since exits in English auctions are public,
one player’s quitting conveys information to the other players about the quitter’s
signal. Suppose there is an increasing function σ (p) mapping prices into profiles
of signals such that vi (σ (p)) = vj (σ (p)) = p for all i and j. Suppose that no
player has quit, and the price is p. Then, in the proposed equilibrium player i
stays in the auction as long as si > σi (p) and quits when si = σi (p). Therefore,
when a player quits, his signal si = σi (p) becomes known. This is a reasonable
strategy since, as long as nobody quits, players know that s ≥ σ (p) and therefore
vi (s) ≥ p for all i. In any sub-auction in which the set of active players is B, let
us call yN\B the vector of known signals of the players who have already quit.
The informal description of the strategies that will be used in the efficient ex-post
equilibrium are the following:
• in the empty history, player i remains in the auction as long as b ≥ si > σi (p)
(the profile of signals 0 satisfies (a) and (b) of Lemma A.1 below, so the function
σ exists); all players know this; player i drops at the lowest price p such that
si = σi (p) ; let the price of the first drop be p
1, let i∗ be the player who drops at p1
and at the time of his drop, player i∗’s signal becomes known, so let yi∗ = σi∗ (p1) ;
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• letA = N\ {i∗} and yN\A ≡ yi∗ and notice that since σ (p1) satisfies vj (σ (p1)) =
p for all j, the profile yA = σ−i∗ (p1) satisfies the conditions of Lemma A.1, so
that a function σy
N\A
satisfying (i)-(iii) in that Lemma exists. Then, player j ∈ A
remains in the auction as long as sj ≥ σyN\A (p), and drops at the lowest p such
that sj = σ
yN\A (p) .
• the process continues in this fashion.
The formal description of the strategies just mentioned is as follows: in a sub-
game in which types yN\A are known and active players are A, βAi
(
si,y
N\A) =
βy
N\A
i (si) = min
{
p : σy
N\A
(p) ≥ si
}
. Notice that since σ is continuous and
weakly increasing, β is strictly increasing and well defined.
The following Lemma proves the existence of a σ function as described above
for any (relevant) sub auction. For any set A ⊆ N, any player i ∈ A, and any y,
let V y
N\A
i : [0, b]
|A| → R be defined by V yN\Ai (s) = vi
(
s,yN\A
)
.
Lemma A.1. Fix any B ⊆ N, with |B| > 1, and fix a profile of types yN\B
such that there exists yB 6= b for which for all i ∈ B, yi < b implies vi (y) =
maxj∈N vj (y) . If v is increasing at ties and satisfies the OEP, there exists a
pBy > maxi vi (y) and a weakly increasing function σ
yN\B :
[
maxi vi (y) , p
B
y
] →∏
i∈B
[yi, b] mapping prices into types of active players, such that:
(i) σy
N\B
j
(
pBy
)
= b for some j with yj < b and for all i ∈ B, p = pBy and
yi < b imply the break even condition
(8) V y
N\B
i
(
σy
N\B
(p)
)
= p.
holds;
(ii) for all p < pBy , if yi < b then σ
yN\B
i (p) < b and the break even condition
(8) hold;
(iii) for all p ≤ pBy , and all k ∈ N, vk
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
≤ p.
The proof of Lemma A.1 is based on the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. Fix any A ⊆ N, with |A| > 1, and fix a profile of types yN\A such
that there exists a yA for which:
(a) for all i, j ∈ A, vi (y) = vj (y) and yi, yj < b
(b) for all k /∈ A, and i ∈ A, vk (y) ≤ vi (y).
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If v is increasing at ties and satisfies the OEP, there exists a pAy > vi (y) =
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
(for i ∈ A) and a weakly increasing function σyN\A :
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
, pAy
]
→∏
i∈A
[yi, b] mapping prices into types of active players, such that:
(i) σy
N\A
j
(
pAy
)
= b for some j, and for all i ∈ A, p = pAy implies that the
condition (8) holds.
(ii) for all p < pAy , σ
yN\A (p) b = (b, ..., b) and the break even condition (8)
holds for all i ∈ A.
(iii) for all p ≤ pAy , and all k ∈ N, vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
≤ p
Proof of Lemma A.2. Fix any A and y that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Let(
b,yA−i
)
denote the vector yA with the ith component replaced by a b. Since
V y
N\A
i is strictly increasing in si and yi < b (by (a)) we get for all i, V
yN\A
i
(
yA
)
<
V y
N\A
i
(
b,yA−i
)
.
Defining a nonempty set X. For any i ∈ A, let pi =
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
,mini V
yN\A
i
(
b,yA−i
)]
.
Let Y =
{
(P, σ) : V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
= vi (y) ∈ P ⊆ pi, σ : P →
∏
A
[
yAi , b
]}
and
X =
{
(P, σ) ∈ Y : σ weakly increasing, σ (vi (y)) = yA, V yN\Ai (σ (p)) = p, ∀ (i, p) ∈ A× P
}
.
Notice that by condition (a) P = {p : p = vi (y) for some i ∈ A} is a singleton
and the function σ defined by σ (vi (y)) = y
A satisfies V y
N\A
i (σ (p)) = p. There-
fore, X is nonempty.
Defining a partial order on X. Define a partial order onX by (P ′, σ′)  (P, σ)
if and only if P ′ ⊇ P and σ′ (p) = σ (p) for all p ∈ P.
Showing that every chain in X has an upper bound. Take any totally
ordered set (a chain) {(Pα, σα)}α in X and define P ≡ ∪αPα and σ : P →∏
A
[
yAi , b
]
through σ (p) = σα (p) for any α such that p ∈ Pα. Notice that the
definition of σ does not depend on the specific α chosen, since if p belongs to two
different Pα and Pα′ , we still get σα (p) = σα′ (p) . I will first show that (P, σ) ∈ X,
and then that (P, σ) is an upper bound for {(Pα, σα)}α .
It is easy to check that σ is weakly increasing. Also, for any p ∈ P, there is
some α for which: p ∈ Pα and σα (p) = σ (p) . Then, since (Pα, σα) ∈ X, we get
V y
N\A
i (σα (p)) = p⇒ V y
N\A
i (σ (p)) = p
showing that (P, σ) ∈ X.
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To see that (P, σ) is an upper bound, note that for any α we have P ⊇ Pα and
σ (p) = σα (p) for all p ∈ Pα.
Showing that the maximal element implied by Zorn’s Lemma must
have P = pi. Zorn’s lemma then ensures that there exists a maximal element(
PM , σM
)
in X. We now show that PM = pi. Suppose p′ /∈ PM , notice that we
have vi (y) ∈ PM and vi (y) is a lower bound for PM , so
{
p˜ ∈ PM : p˜ < p′} is
nonempty, so define p∗ = supep {p˜ ∈ PM : p˜ < p′}. If there is some p ∈ PM such
that p > p′ let
p∗ = infep
{
p˜ ∈ PM : p˜ > p′} .
Case A, p∗ /∈ PM . Consider first the case in which p∗ /∈ PM . We set P ′ =
PM ∪ {p∗} and letting {pn} be an increasing sequence in PM that converges to
p∗, define σ′ on P ′ through
σ′ (p) =
{
σ′ (p) = σM (p) for all p 6= p∗
σ′ (p∗) = limn σM (pn)
.
Since σM is increasing, the limit is well defined. Moreover, it is easy to check
that σ′ is increasing. For all p ∈ PM , we already know that V yN\Ai (σ′ (p)) =
V y
N\A
i
(
σM (p)
)
= p holds, and for p∗, we also have that, by continuity of V
yN\A
i ,
V y
N\A
i (σ
′ (p∗)) = V
yN\A
i
(
lim
n
σM (pn)
)
= lim
n
V y
N\A
i
(
σM (pn)
)
= lim
n
pn = p∗
establishing that (P ′, σ′) ∈ X. Since (P ′, σ′)  (PM , σM) by construction, this
contradicts
(
PM , σM
)
being maximal.
Case B, p∗ ∈ PM and ∃p ∈ PM such that p > p′. Consider now the case in
which p∗ ∈ PM , so that p∗ < p′. If there is some p ∈ PM such that p > p′, one
can follow the same steps as in Case A to discard the case in which p∗ /∈ PM , so
assume that p∗ ∈ PM . Let s = σM (p∗), and s = σM (p∗) and fix any p with
(9) p∗ < p < minV
yN\A
i
(
si, σ
M
−i (p∗)
) ≤ p∗
Assume, without loss of generality, that si > si for all i (when they are equal,
the signal of player i just becomes a fixed “parameter” in the V functions, and
thus plays no role).
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Let g : R → (−1, 1) be any strictly decreasing function with g (0) = 0. For
i ∈ A, let
hi (s) =

si + g
(
V y
N\A
i (s)− p
)
(si − si) if V y
N\A
i (s) > p
si if V
yN\A
i (s) = p
si + g
(
V y
N\A
i (s)− p
)
(si − si) if V yN\Ai (s) < p
The function
h :
∏
A
[si, si]→
∏
A
[si, si]
satisfies hypothesis of Brouwer, so there is a fixed point sf . We now show that
∀i,
(10) V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
= p.
(1) Suppose that for some i, V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
> p. Then we get V y
N\A
i
(
sf
) − p > 0,
and since hi
(
sf
)
= sfi , we must have s
f
i = si (otherwise, g
(
V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)− p)
would be subtracting something from sfi ). We then get V
yN\A
i
(
si, s
f
−i
)
> p and
since equation (9) ensures
V y
N\A
i (s) = V
yN\A
i (σ (p∗)) = p∗,
we must have sfj > sj for some j. Let k be the player with s
f
k > sk for whom
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)
= maxi:sfi >si
V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
. By applying the OEP we see that that for
player i with V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
> p and sfi = si,
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
) ≥ max
j:sfj=sj
V y
N\A
j
(
sf
) ≥ V yN\Ai (sf) > p.
Then, player k is such that V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)
> p, but since
hk
(
sf
)
= sfk = s
f
k + g
(
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)− p)(sfk − sk)
with g
(
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)− p) < 0 which contradicts sf being a fixed point.
(2) If V y
N\A
m
(
sf
)
< p, for some m, then, since hm
(
sf
)
= sfm, we must have
sfm = sm, because otherwise g
(
V y
N\A
m
(
sf
)− p) would be adding something
strictly positive to sfm. Because we can use that v is increasing at ties with
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s′ =
(
sm, s
f
−m,y
N\A
)
and s =
(
σ (p∗) ,yN\A
)
, we obtain
p > V y
N\A
m
(
sf
)
= V y
N\A
m
(
sm, s
f
−m
)
≥ V yN\Am
(
sm, s−m
)
= V y
N\A
m (sm, σ−m (p∗))
≥ minV yN\Ai (si, σ−i (p∗)) > p
which is a contradiction. That is, we had chosen a small p, so that a large increase
in the signal of m from sm to sm increases V
yN\A
m above p.
Items 1 and 2 have established that V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
= p for all i, so that P ′ =
PM ∪ {p} and
σ′ (p˜) =
{
σ′ (p˜) = σM (p˜) for all p˜ 6= p
σ′ (p) = sf
satisfy (P ′, σ′)  (PM , σM) which contradicts (PM , σM) being maximal. We
conclude that PM = pi, and that σM maps pi =
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
,mini V
yN\A
i
(
b,yA−i
)]
into
∏
A
[
yAi , b
]
, is increasing and V y
N\A
i
(
σM (p)
)
= p, ∀i ∈ A,∀p ∈ pi.
Case C, p∗ ∈ PM and @p ∈ PM such that p > p′. Recall s = σ (p∗) and fix
any p with
(11) p∗ = V
yN\A
i (s) < p ≤ minVi
(
b,yA−i
)
.
Let g : R→ (−1, 1) be any strictly decreasing function with g (0) = 0. For i ∈ A,
let
hi (s) =

si + g
(
V y
N\A
i (s)− p
)
(si − si) if V y
N\A
i (s) > p
si if V
yN\A
i (s) = p
si + g
(
V y
N\A
i (s)− p
)
(b− si) if V yN\Ai (s) < p
The function h has a fixed point sf , so we will show that for all i, V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
= p.
(1) Suppose that for some i, V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
> p, so that sfi = si. We then get
V y
N\A
i
(
si, s
f
−i
)
> p and since V y
N\A
i (s) < p, we must have s
f
j > sj for some j.
Let k be the player with sfk > sk for whom V
yN\A
k
(
sf
)
= maxi:sfi >si
V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
.
By applying the OEP we see that that for player i with V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
> p and
sfi = si,
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
) ≥ max
j:sfj= sj
V y
N\A
j
(
sf
) ≥ V yN\Ai (sf) > p.
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Then, player k is such that V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)
> p, but since sfk > sk,
hk
(
sf
)
= sfk = s
f
k + g
(
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)− p)(sfk − sk)
with g
(
V y
N\A
k
(
sf
)− p) < 0 which contradicts sf being a fixed point.
(2) If V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
< p, for some i, then, since hi
(
sf
)
= sfi , we must have s
f
i = b.
Then, using the choice of p in equation (11) and that v is increasing at ties, with
s′ =
(
b, sf−i,y
N\A
)
and s = y, we obtain
p > V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
= V y
N\A
i
(
b, sf−i
)
≥ V yN\Ai
(
b,yA−i
) ≥ minV yN\Ai (b,yA−i) ≥ p
which is a contradiction.
Items 1 and 2 have established for all i, so that P ′ = PM ∪ {p} and
σ′ (p˜) =
{
σ′ (p˜) = σM (p˜) for all p˜ 6= p
σ′ (p) = sf
satisfy (P ′, σ′)  (PM , σM) which contradicts (PM , σM) being maximal. We
conclude that PM = pi, and that σM maps pi =
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
,mini V
yN\A
i
(
b,yA−i
)]
into
∏
A
[
yAi , b
]
, is increasing and V y
N\A
i
(
σM (p)
)
= p, ∀i ∈ A,∀p ∈ pi.
So far we have established that for all p in
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
,mini V
yN\A
i
(
b,yA−i
)]
there exists of a profile of signals σy
N\A
(p) ≡ sf such that V yN\Ai
(
σy
N\A
(p)
)
=
V y
N\A
i
(
sf
)
= p for all i, for all p ≤ minVi
(
b,yA−i
)
, and σy
N\A
is increasing. Since
y and A are fixed throughout the proof, we will let σ (p) stand for σy
N\A
(p) and
Vi for V
yN\A
i .
Let p1 = minVi
(
b,yA−i
)
and fix s1 = σ (p1) . If s1i = b for some i, the proof is
complete by letting pAy = p
1 since for all p < p1 we have that σ (p)  b, for if
σi (p) was equal to b, we would get the following contradiction
p = Vi (σ (p)) ≥ minVi (σ (p)) ≥ minVi
(
b,yA−i
)
= p1 > p.
So assume s1i < b for all i. Then, we have that
p1 = minVi
(
b,yA−i
)
= Vi
(
σ
(
p1
))
= Vi
(
s1
)
and s1i < b imply that p
1 < minVi
(
b, s1−i
) ≡ p2. Fix any p1 < p ≤ p2. We can
now repeat exactly the same steps as we have done so far (with s1 in place of yA)
and show that in the domain
[
V y
N\A
i
(
yA
)
,mini Vi
(
b, s1−i
)]
one has an increasing
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function σ (·) such that Vi (σ (p)) = p for all i. Fix any s2 = σ (p2) , and notice
again that if σi (p
2) = b for some i, the proof is complete by letting pAy = p
2.
Continuing in this fashion, we get an increasing sequence of st and pt with the
properties that for all i,
Vi
(
st
)
= pt < pt+1 = min
i
Vi
(
b, st−i
)
.
In the limit p∞, s∞ we obtain for all i
Vi (s
∞) = p∞ = min
i
Vi
(
b, s∞−i
)
and so, for some i, Vi (s
∞) = p∞ = Vi
(
b, s∞−i
)
. Since Vi is increasing in si this
means that s∞i = b, so that we can set p
A
y = p
∞. This completes the proof of (i)
and (ii).
To establish (iii) set s′ =
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
and s = y. If s′ = s conditions
(a) and (b) yield the desired result, so assume s′ 6= s. Note that: k ∈ A implies
p = vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
; k /∈ A implies that s′k = sk so that the OEP ensures
p = max
k:s′k>sk
vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
≥ max
k:s′k=sk
vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
≥ vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
for all k /∈ A as was to be shown. 
The previous Lemma establishes the existence of a σ function that maps prices
into signals, the resulting profile of signals being the “presumption” that other
players will have about a players’ signal, if he quits at a certain price. The set A
is the set of “active” players at a certain moment, and the profile of signals y is
decomposed in the set of signals of inactive players yN\A and the set of signals
such that all active players have signals greater than yA. Lemma A.1 describes
the presumption of other players about a certain player’s signal, when he should
have quit, but he didn’t (in the sense that his presumed signal is b, but he didn’t
quit). The difference with the previous Lemma is that we allow some elements
of yB to be equal to b (whereas in Lemma A.2 we had yBi < b for all i in B).
Proof of Lemma A.1. Let B and y be as in the statement of this Lemma. Con-
sider first the case in which yk < b for k = i, j ∈ B, i 6= j. Defining A =
B\ {j ∈ B : yj = b} and applying Lemma A.2 yields the desired result. So as-
sume there is a unique i ∈ B such that yi < b. Let pBy = vi (b,y−i) and let
v−1i (p;y−i) be the “inverse” of vi, defined by
vi
(
v−1i (p;y−i) ,y−i
) ≡ p.
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Then, it is easy to check that σy
N\B
defined by
σy
N\B
j (p) =
{
b j ∈ B\ {i}
v−1i (p;y−i) j = i
.
satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). To check condition (iii), two cases must be con-
sidered.
(I) If |W (y)| > 1, we have that for s = y, and
s′ =
(
σy
N\B
i (p) ,y−i
)
=
(
σy
N\B
i (p) , b, ..., b,y
N\B
)
=
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
the OEP implies that since i is the only player for which s′i > si, for all p,
p = vi (s
′) = max
j:s′j>sj
vj (s
′) ≥ max
j 6=i
vj (s
′) = max
j 6=i
vj
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
as was to be shown.
(II) If |W (y)| = 1, we have that for p∗ = maxj vj (y) = vi (y) ,
(12)
vi
(
σy
N\B
(p∗) ,yN\B
)
= max
j∈N
vj (y) > max
j 6=i
vj (y) = max
j 6=i
vj
(
σy
N\B
(p∗) ,yN\B
)
.
Suppose that contrary to what we want to show, there was some p such that for
some j 6= i
(13) vj
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
> p = vi
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
.
Given equations (12) and (13), continuity of σy
N\B
(p) (ensured by construction)
and Bolzano’s Theorem, there exists a p∗ such that maxj 6=i vj
(
σy
N\B
(p∗) ,yN\B
)
=
vi
(
σy
N\B
(p∗) ,yN\B
)
. Then, letting s′ =
(
σy
N\B
i (p) ,y−i
)
and s =
(
σy
N\B
i (p
∗) ,y−i
)
the OEP implies
vi (s
′) ≥ max
k 6=i
vk (s
′) ≥ vj (s′)⇔ vi
(
σy
N\B
i (p) ,y−i
)
≥ vj
(
σy
N\B
(p) ,yN\B
)
which contradicts (13), and therefore completes the proof. 
The next Lemma gives the connection between one set of functions σB and
the set of functions σA when A = B\ {l} for some l ∈ B. This gives the relation
between the bidding strategies in a sub-auction with active players B, and the
one that follows after player l has dropped out. If various players drop out at the
same price, one only needs to apply the Lemma repeatedly at the price of the
drops (p˜ in the Lemma).
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Lemma A.3. Fix any B ⊆ N, with |B| > 2, and fix a set of types yN\B such
that there exists a yB 6= b for which for all i ∈ B, yi < b implies vi (y) =
maxj∈N vj (y) . Assume that v is increasing at ties and satisfies the OEP, and
fix a pBy and σ
yN\B as in the statement of Lemma A.1. Fix any l ∈ B and let
A = B\ {l}. For any p˜ ≤ pBy , if sB = σyN\B (p˜) then for z ≡
(
yN\B, sl
)
there
exists pAz ≥ vi
(
sB,yN\B
)
= V zi
(
sA
)
(for i with yi < b) and a weakly increasing
function σz :
[
V zi
(
sA
)
, pAz
] → ∏
i∈A
[si, b] mapping prices into types of active
players, such that:
(i) σzj
(
pAz
)
= b for some j with yj < b and for all i ∈ A, p = pAy and yi < b
imply the break even condition
(14) V zi (σ
z (p)) = p.
(ii) for all p < pAz , if yi < b then σ
z
i (p) < b and the break even condition (14)
holds for all i ∈ A.
(iii) for all p ≤ pAy , and all k ∈ N, vk
(
σy
N\A
(p) ,yN\A
)
≤ p.
(iv) for all j ∈ A
σzj (p˜) = σ
yN\B
j (p˜) .
Proof of Lemma A.3. Items (i), (ii) and (iii) follow as a direct application of
Lemma A.1. Then, item (iv) follows because for all i, σzi (p˜) ≥ sAi , and if
σzj (p˜) > s
A
j we would get (using s
′ =
(
sAj , σ
z
−j (p) , z
)
and s =
(
sA, z
)
and that v
is increasing at ties)
p˜ = V zj (σ
z (p˜)) > V zj
(
sAj , σ
z
−j (p)
) ≥ V zj (sA)
= vj
(
sB,yN\B
)
= V y
N\B
j
(
sB
)
= V y
N\B
j
(
σy
N\B
(p˜)
)
= p˜
which is a contradiction. 
We now show that the σ function is continuous.
Lemma A.4. For every A and yN\A satisfying the conditions of Lemma A.1,
the function σy
N\A
is continuous.
Proof of Lemma A.4. Suppose that σ is discontinuous at p∗. It must be either not
continuous from the right, or from the left, so assume without loss of generality
that it is discontinuous from the left: there is an ε such that for all δ there is
some p with p∗ − p < δ but σ (p∗) − σ (p) ≥ ε (we have used σ non decreasing).
Fix then δ1 = 1 and p1 < p
∗ such that p∗ − p1 < δ1 but σ (p∗)− σ (p1) ≥ ε. Pick
then, by induction, δn = (p
∗ − pn−1) /2 and p∗ − pn < δn but σ (p∗)− σ (pn) ≥ ε.
We then obtain: pn → p∗, pn is increasing, σ (pn) is increasing and therefore has
a limit (since its bounded above by b) s∞ and s∞ 6= σ (p∗) , s∞ ≤ σ (p∗).
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Since for all n and for all i, Vi (σ (pn)) = pn we obtain by continuity of Vi,
p∗ = lim pn = limVi (σ (pn)) = Vi (limσ (pn)) = Vi (s∞) .
But then, s∞ 6= σ (p∗) and s∞ ≤ σ (p∗) imply that for some i, s∞i < σi (p∗). This,
in turn, means that since Vi is strictly increasing in si and increasing at ties (at
s∞ all are tied), Vi (s∞) < Vi (σ (p∗)) = p∗. This is a contradiction, and shows
that σ is continuous. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Ex Post. We will prove that the profile of strategies that in
any auction with active players A and signals of inactive players yN\A calls for a
player with signal si to quit at a price β
yN\A
i (si) = min
{
p : σy
N\A
(p) ≥ si
}
, for
σ as in Lemma A.1, is an ex post equilibrium. We will then show that it is also
efficient.
The first part of the proof (ex-post equilibrium) follows Krishna’s Lemma 1
closely, but does not use the fact that σ is unique or strictly increasing. Consider
bidder 1 and suppose that all bidders i > 1 are following the strategy βi. We
show that player 1 does not have a profitable deviation.
Consider first the case in which following β1 player 1 wins when active players
are A and signals are s: this can only happen if players in A\ {1} drop at the same
price, say p∗. We will show that he earns a profit, no deviations are profitable:
quitting before earns him 0, and he can never change the price he pays. Without
loss of generality, let A = {2, 3, ..., a} . Since all strategies β are increasing, all
bidders in A can infer the signals sN\A of inactive bidders from the prices at
which they dropped. Also, since player i = 2, ..., a drop at p∗ and
βs
N\A
i (si) = min
{
p : σs
N\A
(p) ≥ si
}
= p∗
we obtain si = σ
sN\A
i (p
∗) .Moreover, s1 > σs
N\A
1 (p
∗) and therefore V s
N\A
1
(
σs
N\A
(p∗)
)
=
p∗ implies
v1 (s) = v1
(
s1, σ
sN\A
−1 (p
∗) , sN\A
)
> v1
(
σs
N\A
(p∗) , sN\A
)
= V s
N\A
1
(
σs
N\A
(p∗)
)
= p∗
which means that player 1 makes a profit, as was to be shown.
Consider the case in which β1 calls for bidder 1 to drop at some price p
∗
1 in
some sub-auction with active bidders A = {1, 2, ..., a} , when the other players
quit at signals sN\A, and suppose that bidder 1 evaluates staying longer until he
wins the object. Suppose he stays until winning and that bidders quit in the
order a, a− 1, a− 2, ..., 2 at prices pa ≤ ...,≤ p2, so that 1 wins at a price p2. We
will show that by doing this he cannot make a profit.
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For p2, the price at which player 2 quits, s2 = σ
sN\{1,2}
2 (p2) so (iii) of Lemma
A.1 implies that
(15) p2 ≥ v1
(
σs
N\{1,2}
1 (p2) , s−1
)
.
Then, since for each fixed pair
(
B, sN\B
)
the function σs
N\B
is increasing and
when a bidder j ∈ B drops out at pj, we get σsN\B (pj) = σsN\{B\{j}} (pj) (by (iv)
of Lemma A.3), we obtain
σs
N\{1,2}
1 (p2) ≥ σs
N\{1,2}
1 (p3) = σ
sN\{1,2,3}
1 (p3) ≥ σs
N\{1,2,3}
1 (p4) = σ
sN\{1,2,3,4}
1 (p4) ≥ ...
≥ σsN\{A\{a}} (pa) = σsN\A1 (pa) ≥ σs
N\A
1 (p
∗
1) = s1.(16)
(the last equality follows from the fact that player 1 was supposed to quit at p∗1).
Equations (15) and (16) imply that p2 ≥ v1 (s) so that player 1 cannot make a
profit by staying longer than what his strategy calls for.
We have already shown that it is not profitable to quit when β1 calls for staying,
and it is not profitable to stay when β1 calls for quitting. We will now show that
if in some off equilibrium path, player 1 is still active at price p when he should
have quit at price p∗1 < p, then quitting is a best response (in particular, it is
better than winning at p). Let the set of active bidders at p be J = {1, ..., j} .
Then, as in equation (16),
σs
N\J
1 (p) ≥ σs
N\J
1 (pj+1) = σ
sN\{J∪{j+1}}
1 (pj+1) ≥ ... ≥ σs
N\A
1 (pa) ≥ σs
N\A
1 (p
∗
1) = s1
so that p ≥ v1
(
σs
N\J
(p) , sN\J
)
implies p ≥ v1
(
s1, σ
sN\J
−1 (p) , s
N\J
)
. This means
quitting, as his strategy prescribes, is optimal. This completes the proof that the
profile of strategies defined by σ is an ex-post equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Efficiency. Without loss of generality, suppose that at a
profile of signals s the winner is player 1 and that the last to quit is player
2 at price p2. Then, we have that s1 > σ
sN\{1,2}
1 (p2) , s2 = σ
sN\{1,2}
2 (p2) and
v1
(
σs
N\{1,2}
(p2) , s
N\{1,2}
)
= v2
(
σs
N\{1,2}
(p2) , s
N\{1,2}
)
. The OEP then tells us
that for
P =
{
i : si >
(
σs
N\{1,2}
(p2) , s
N\{1,2}
)
i
}
we must have
v1 (s) = max
i∈P
vi (s) ≥ max
j /∈P
vj (s)
establishing efficiency. 
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 5, we prove Lemma 8, which in
turn uses this simple result.
28 DUBRA, ECHENIQUE, AND MANELLI
Lemma A.5. If v satisfies the ACC, then for all P ⊆ N such that j ∈ P we
have that for any s with |W (s)| > 1 and i 6= j∑
k∈P
∂vk (s)
∂sj
> |P | ∂vi (s)
∂sj
Proof of Lemma A.5. The proof proceeds by induction on the size of P. We al-
ready know that the result is true for P = N, so assume it is true for all P ′ with
|P ′| = m + 1. In order to obtain a contradiction, suppose that for some P with
|P | = m, j ∈ P , and some s with |W (s)| > 1 and i 6= j we had∑P ∂vk∂sj ≤ |P | ∂vi∂sj .
In such a case, we must have i ∈ P, since otherwise, for P ′ = P ∪ {i} we would
have
∑
P ′
∂vk
∂sj
≤ |P ′| ∂vi
∂sj
, contradicting the induction hypothesis. We must also
have ∂vi/∂sj > ∂vh/∂sj for all h /∈ P, since otherwise, for some h /∈ P with
∂vi/∂sj ≤ ∂vh/∂sj we would have that for P ′ = P ∪ {h}∑
k∈P
∂vk
∂sj
≤ |P | ∂vi
∂sj
≤ |P | ∂vh
∂sj
⇒
∑
P ′
∂vk
∂sj
≤ |P ′| ∂vh
∂sj
contradicting the induction hypothesis. But then ∂vi/∂sj > ∂vh/∂sj for all h /∈ P,
implies that∑
k∈P
∂vk
∂sj
≤ |P | ∂vi
∂sj
⇒
∑
k∈P
∂vk
∂sj
+
∑
h/∈P
∂vh
∂sj
< |P | ∂vi
∂sj
+|N\P | ∂vi
∂sj
⇔
∑
k∈N
∂vk
∂sj
< |N | ∂vi
∂sj
which contradicts the ACC. This concludes the proof. 
Definition. The set of functions v satisfies the Equal Increments Condition if
for all s with |W (s)| > 1 and any P ⊆ N there exists j ∈ P such that for any
i /∈ P, IP∇vj > IP∇vi.
We present a simple lemma that will help us show that both the Average
Crossing Condition and the Cyclical Crossing Condition imply the OEP. The
key to showing that these conditions imply the OEP is making the connection
between the effect of one signal on all valuations (as stated in the ACC and CCC)
and the effect of several signals on the valuations of two players.
Lemma 8. If v satisfies the ACC or the CCC then it satisfies the Equal Incre-
ments Condition.
Lemma 8 asserts that when one increases the signals of a set of winners (by the
same small amount) then the total growth of the valuation of one of the players
whose signal increased is larger than the growth of any of those whose signals did
not increase.
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Proof of Lemma 8. We first show that ACC implies the Equal Increments Con-
dition. For all h ∈ P, and i /∈ P, by Lemma A.5, ∑P ∂vk(s)∂sh > |P | ∂vi(s)∂sh . Keeping
i fixed, and adding over all h ∈ P, we obtain∑
h∈P
∑
k∈P
∂vk (s)
∂sh
>
∑
h∈P
|P | ∂vi (s)
∂sh
.
We can write the previous equation as∑
k∈P
IP∇vk > |P | IP∇vi.
This implies that for some j ∈ P, IP∇vj > IP∇vi as was to be shown.
Now assume that v satisfies the CCC, and pick any s with |W (s)| > 1 and any
i /∈ P. We must show that there exists j ∈ P such that IP∇vj > IP∇vi. Suppose
first that there is some k ∈ P with k < i and let j be the largest k in P which is
still smaller than i. In order to show that IP∇vj > IP∇vi, it will suffice to show
that for all k ∈ P\ {j} , ∂vj/∂sk ≥ ∂vi/∂sk, since then ∂vj/∂sj > ∂vi/∂sj will
make the desired inequality strict. Notice that for all k < i, we have k < j < i,
so by the CCC, we have ∂vj/∂sk ≥ ∂vi/∂sk. For k > i, we have that the CCC
tells us that
∂vk
∂sk
>
∂v1
∂sk
≥ ∂vj
∂sk
≥ ∂vi
∂sk
.
Suppose now that for the chosen i there is no k < i in P. For j ≡ maxk∈P P
we will show, as before, that for all k ∈ P\ {j} , ∂vj/∂sk ≥ ∂vi/∂sk. Notice that
for all k ∈ P\ {j} we have i < k < j, so the CCC tells us that
∂vk
∂sk
>
∂vj
∂sk
≥ ∂vn
∂sk
≥ ∂v1
∂sk
≥ ∂vi
∂sk
as was to be shown. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose the OEP is violated, so that there exists an s with
|W (s)| > 1 and an s′ ≥ s such that s′j > sj if and only if j ∈ P ⊆ W (s), and
that for all j ∈ P, vj (s′) < vi (s′) for some i. Without loss of generality, suppose
P = {1, ...,m} and assume also without loss of generality, that s′1−s1 ≤ s′2−s2 ≤
... ≤ s′m − sm. Define
α1 = max {α : ∃j ∈ P, vj (s+ IPα) ≥ vi (s+ IPα)∀i /∈ P} .
Note that if for any α ≤ s′1 − s1 we had that for some i /∈ P, and ∀j ∈
P, vj (s+ IPα) < vi (s+ IPα) , there would be some α
∗ ∈ [0, α) such that for
some j ∈ P and i /∈ P : vj (s+ IPα∗) = vi (s+ IPα∗) and for all ε > 0,
vk (s+ IP [α
∗ + ε]) < vi (s+ IP [α∗ + ε]) for all k ∈ P. Taking derivatives with
respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0, we obtain that for s′ = s + IPα∗ we have
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|W (s′)| > 1, and that IP∇vk (s+ IPα∗) ≤ IP∇vi (s+ IPα∗) for all k ∈ P , which
contradicts the Equal Increments condition, and would thus by Lemma 8 conclude
the proof. Assume then α1 > s
′
1 − s1.
Define then P2 = P\ {1}, and
α2 = max {α : ∃j ∈ P2, vj ((s′1, s−1) + IP2α) ≥ vi ((s′1, s−1) + IP2α)∀i /∈ P2} .
Since for all α ≤ s′1 − s1, ∃j ∈ P, such that vj (s+ IPα) ≥ vi (s+ IPα)∀i /∈ P,
we have that α = s′1 − s1 belongs to the set over which the max is taken, so α2
is well defined. If we had α2 ≤ s′2 − s2, we would obtain that there are j ∈ P2
and i /∈ P2 such that vj ((s′1, s−1) + IP2α2) = vi ((s′1, s−1) + IP2α2) and that for
all ε > 0, vk ((s
′
1, s−1) + IP2 [α2 + ε]) < vi ((s
′
1, s−1) + IP2 [α2 + ε]) for all k ∈ P2.
Taking derivatives with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = 0, we obtain that for
s′ = (s′1, s−1) + IP2α2 we have |W (s′)| > 1, and that for all k ∈ P2
IP2∇vk (s′) ≤ IP2∇vi (s′)
which contradicts the Equal Increments condition, and would thus by Lemma 8
conclude the proof.
Fix some l ≤ m and define s˜ = (s′1, ..., s′l−1, sl, sl+1, ..., sn) and Pl = P\ {1, ..., l − 1} .
As an induction hypothesis, suppose that for some j ∈ Pl, vj (s˜) ≥ vi (s˜) for all
i /∈ Pl (we have already proved this for l = 1 and l = 2) and define
αl = max {α : ∃j ∈ Pl, vj (s˜+ IPlα) ≥ vi (s˜+ IPlα)∀i /∈ Pl} .
Again, if we had αl ≤ s′l−sl we would obtain that there are j ∈ Pl and i /∈ Pl such
that vj (s˜+ IPlαl) = vi (s˜+ IPlαl) and that for all ε > 0, vk (s˜+ IPl [αl + ε]) <
vi (s˜+ IPl [αl + ε]) for all k ∈ Pl. Taking derivatives with respect to ε and eval-
uating at ε = 0, we obtain that for s′ = s˜ + IPlαl we have |W (s′)| > 1, and
that IPl∇vk (s′) ≤ IPl∇vi (s′) for all k ∈ Pl. This contradiction concludes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose there is an interior s, and an s′ ≥ s with s′j > sj iff
j ∈ P ⊆ W (s) but that maxj:s′j>sj vj (s′) < maxk:s′k=sk vk (s′) (i.e. W (s′)∩P = ∅).
Suppose, without loss of generality that P = {1, 2, ...,m} andW (s) = {1, 2, ..., k}
for k ≥ m. For all i /∈ W (s) and j ∈ W (s) we have vi (s) < vj (s). By continuity
of the v functions, there is ε1 > 0 such that for all
(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
k) ∈ Bkε1 (s) =
{
s∗ ∈ Rk : ‖s∗ − (s1, ..., sk)‖ < ε1
}
we have vi (s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
k, sk+1, ..., sn) < vj (s
∗
1, ..., s
∗
k, sk+1, ..., sn) for all i /∈ W (s) and
j ∈ W (s). Moreover, since W (s′) ∩ P = ∅, there exists a small ε2 > 0 such that
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for all
(s∗1, ..., s
∗
k) ∈ Bkε2 (s) =
{
s∗ ∈ Rk : ‖s∗ − (s1, ..., sk)‖ < ε2
}
we also have that for s˜ =
(
s′1, ..., s
′
m, s
∗
m+1, ..., s
∗
k, sk+1, ..., sn
)
, W (s˜) ∩ P = ∅ (as
W (s′) ∩ P = ∅).
Then, define B = Bkε1 (s) ∩Bkε2 (s) , and for each j ∈ W (s), define vkj : B → R
by vkj (x) = vj (x,sk+1, ..., sn) . Since s is interior and (by regularity) the Jacobian
of vk =
(
vk1 , ..., v
k
k
)
is invertible at (s1, s2, ..., sk) , the Inverse Function Theorem
ensures that one can find (s∗1, ..., s
∗
m, .., s
∗
k) ∈ B such that:
(a) for s∗ = (s∗1, ..., s
∗
k, sk+1, ..., sn) , W (s
∗) = P (by the Inverse Function Theo-
rem, we can reduce the valuation vi for all i in W (s) \P, while keeping those of
players in P constant; for players i not in W (s) the fact that (s∗1, ..., s
∗
m, .., s
∗
k) ∈
B ⊆ Bkε1 (s) ensures that vi (s∗1, ..., s∗k, sk+1, ..., sn) < vj (s∗1, ..., s∗k, sk+1, ..., sn) for
any j ∈ W (s));
(b) for s˜ =
(
s′1, ..., s
′
m, s
∗
m+1, ..., s
∗
k, sk+1, ..., sn
)
, W (s˜) ∩ P = ∅.
Then, let µ (s∗) = µ (s˜) = 1/2. Since players not in P have no uncertainty in
their type, their bidding functions are just a (possibly) mixed strategy indepen-
dent of the type. Let β be the maximum element in the union of the supports
of all bidding functions of players not in P (when all players in P are active).
Also, for players in P it is a dominant strategy to bid their valuations (that have
no uncertainty), so let β∗i = vi (s
∗) and β˜i = vi (s˜) for all i ∈ P (note that since
P = W (s∗) by item (a), β∗i = β
∗
j for all i, j ∈ P ).
By efficiency, and W (s∗) = P (item a), we must have that all players not in P
must quit with probability 1 before the price reaches β∗i : for all i ∈ P,
(17) β∗i ≥ β.
But since W (s˜) ∩ P = ∅ (item b) efficiency implies that we must also have that
(18) β > max
i∈P
β˜i = max
i∈P
vi (s˜) .
Then, since vi is increasing at ties and strictly increasing in si, we have that for
all i ∈ P, vi (s˜) > vi (s∗) . This implies, together with equations (17) and (18),
that for all i ∈ P,
β∗i ≥ β > max
i∈P
β˜i = max
i∈P
vi (s˜) > max
i∈P
vi (s
∗) = max
i∈P
β∗i
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which is a contradiction. 
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